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Abstract
Many users would prefer the privacy of end-to-end encryption in their online communications if it can be done
without significant inconvenience. However, because existing key distribution methods cannot be fully trusted
enough for automatic use, key management has remained a user problem. We propose a fundamentally new
approach to the key distribution problem by empowering end-users with the capacity to independently verify the
authenticity of public keys using an additional media attestment. This permits client software to automatically
lookup public keys from a keyserver without trusting the keyserver, because any attempted MITM attacks can
be detected by end-users. Thus, our protocol is designed to enable a new breed of messaging clients with true
end-to-end encryption built in, without the hassle of requiring users to manually manage the public keys, that is
verifiably secure against MITM attacks, and does not require trusting any third parties.
1 Introduction
The majority of modern communication systems, includ-
ing email, chat, text messaging, and video calls, are in-
secure and offer little guarantee of privacy to users. Ac-
cording to Google, Gmail users have “no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy” [8]. In general, although most email
servers do require SSL encryption, email contents are
processed and/or stored in plaintext on the mail servers
themselves.
Not only can these email records be subpoenad to
court, but recent revelations show that email and chat
communications are frequently divulged en masse under
duress from government surveillance agencies, that the in-
ternal communications networks of major providers such
as Google and Yahoo have been hacked by NSA surveil-
lance programs, and that in special cases, government
agencies may even be strong-arming certificate authori-
ties to comply in subversion of SSL encryption.
There is a growing public awareness and desire for
privacy in response to these recent revelations of mass
surveillance. For example, in a recent study of U.S. writ-
ers [4], 85% said they were worried about government
surveillance, 73% said they had never been as worried
about privacy rights as they are today, and 24% said they
have avoided certain topics over email due to fears of NSA
spying.
In theory, true privacy can be achieved by using asym-
metric public key cryptography: if each user has a public
encryption key and an associated private decryption key
that nobody else knows, and encryption for a specific re-
cipient is performed by the sender, and decryption is per-
formed by the recipient, then communications providers
only relay encrypted messages and will be incapable of
reading their contents. This is known as end-to-end en-
cryption.
End-to-end encryption protocols for email such as
PGP [19] and its variations (e.g., GnuPG [3] and
OpenPGP [1]) are well known, but these services are not
widely adopted. There are a number of minor technical
excuses that might be given, such as difficulty in perform-
ing search, overcomplexity, lack of standardization, and
difficulty in distributing untampered client software, but
the primary reason is almost certainly the lack of adop-
tion due to end-user inconveniences associated with key
distribution and management.
With PGP, an individual user must generate a pub-
lic/private keypair using an external program, and then
keep their private key secret but accessible. Generally
the private key is stored as a file on the local computer,
which is inconvenient when the user may wish to read
their secure email from a different computer. The sec-
ond, much more significant problem is key distribution:
in order to send an encrypted email to someone, one must
first acquire that person’s public key.
Although there are a number of public keyservers that
offer free registration and lookup of PGP keys associated
with an email address (e.g., [2]), an end user has no way
of knowing if the supplied key is legitimate or not. A
keyserver would be capable of supplying incorrect keys
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in order to faciliate man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
which would enable a third party to read, modify, and
impersonate users in the future. Thus, because a key-
server might have ulterior motives, or might be operating
under duress from a government agency, they cannot be
universally trusted.
An alternative method of key exchange developed for
PGP and related methods is the web of trust (WOT)
[19]. Although the WOT is considered a successful and
popular means of exchanging public keys among certain
circles, the fundamental problem with the WOT is that it
requires caution and intelligent supervision by the users.
It is reliant on all the users to understand the weaknesses
of the protocol, to care about security, and to be mindful
and thorough in verifying each others’ identities. These
assumptions do not scale well to the general public, and
it is fairly easy to subvert the WOT in order to perform
targeted MITM attacks (Section 2). As such, the WOT
cannot be universally trusted either.
In light of these well-known weaknesses, perhaps the
most common method of obtaining public keys in prac-
tice is a manual exchange between users – for example, by
sending the public key over email. It might seem that this
could be automated, and indeed it would be trivial to de-
sign a plaintext-based handshake protocol for exchanging
public keys, but an observer with the capability to read
and modify these initial messages could act as a man-in-
the-middle. Thus, if such a structured protocol were to
come into common usage, it is likely that spying agencies
would attempt this type of attack, either by forcing email
servers into compliance or by hacking into their networks.
In summary, because there are no sufficiently trust-
worthy methods for automatically obtaining public keys
associated with an email address, client applications can-
not perform this operation in the background, and hence
users must be burdened with the inconvenience of man-
ually exchanging public keys with each new person they
wish to communicate securely with. It is not surprising
that the majority of users don’t have the patience for this,
and thus end-to-end encryption has remained niche.
For end-to-end encryption to gain mainstream trac-
tion, a more reliable and convenient method of key man-
agement and exchange must be used. Several companies
such as Lavabit and Hushmail have attempted this by
generating PGP keys on behalf of their users, thereby al-
lowing users to login with a simple password (rather than
requiring a PGP private key), and automatically look-
ing up PGP public keys of in-network recipients using an
internal keyserver. However, the problem with these hy-
brid approaches is that the service providers have access
to users’ private keys and can therefore read users’ pri-
vate messages. This problem has been recently elucidated
by the fact that both Lavabit and Hushmail have been
forced to comply with court-orders and NSA demands to
turn over internal communications, after which Lavabit
(but not Hushmail) chose to shut down its services rather
than to remain complicit in widespread surveillance of its
users.
In response to Lavabit’s shutdown, users and secure
email services alike have proposed to shift their busi-
ness outside of the US, to countries with better privacy
regulations[6]. We propose a more permanent, and fun-
damentally different approach, by providing a method for
end-users to independently verify the authenticity of a
public key by using media attestments. When end-users
have this capability, client software is free to automati-
cally lookup public keys associated with email addresses
from a keyserver without needing to trust the keyserver,
because any MITM attacks could be detected by end-
users. Thus, our protocol enables a new breed of mes-
saging clients with true end-to-end encryption built in,
without the hassle of requiring users to manually manage
the public keys for their contacts, and without relying on
any third party to keep certain information secret.
We first demonstrate the need for a more secure pro-
tocol by explaining the ease in which the WOT may be
subverted (Section 2). Then we introduce the proposed
key authentication protocol (Section 3) by explaining the
inspiration from ‘ask me anyting’ (AMA) sessions on Red-
dit (Section 3.1) and showing how this theory can be ex-
tended for secure key exchange (Section 3.2). We detail
the proposed protocol steps for key registration (Section
3.3), lookup (Section 3.4), rating (Section 3.5) and re-
moval (Section 3.6). Finally, we discuss potential attacks
and resistances (Section 4), present our implementation
of a public keyserver (Section 5), propose recommenda-
tions for compatible client software (Section 5.1), and give
closing remarks (Section 6).
2 Web of Trust Limitations
Public keys are found in the WOT by searching for a
chain of signed public key certificates. Keys which can
be found with fewer hops are generally considered to be
“more trustworthy.” As such, a common metric for trust-
worthiness of a public key is the mean shortest distance
(MSD) to all other keys [9].
In the interest of increasing their own MSD, each user
has an incentive to sign as many public keys as they can.
This has a detrimental effect on security, because it en-
courages people to sign public keys for their own apparent
benefit, making it significantly easier for an impersonator
to get their impostor keys signed. Moreover, the users
who exhibit the least restraint or least thorough verifica-
tion of identities will be able to sign the most keys, and
hence will have the lowest MSD’s. Finally, anyone who is
signed by someone with a low MSD will, by proxy, also
2
acquire a low MSD. Thus, it is very easy for an imper-
sonator to acquire a low MSD, simply by getting their
key signed by someone who has a low MSD, which is very
likely the same person who is willing to sign a key without
doing a thorough background check.
Furthermore, users are encouraged to sign other peo-
ples’ key certificates if their identity can be verified with-
out regard to the integrity of that person. According to
Zimmermann [20], “You aren’t risking your credibility by
signing the public key of a sociopath, if you were com-
pletely confident that the key really belonged to him.”
Unfortunately, this is simply not true, because a person
with ulterior motives can go on to sign keys that they
know are false with the effect of making those keys ap-
pear trustworthy to you or other people based on graph
analysis.
For example, if Eve wants to spy on Alice’s communi-
cations with Bob, she could just get her associates Char-
lie, Dave and Francis to have their keys signed by Alice
and Bob after verifying their identities. Then those same
associates could certify Eve’s impostor key as the key for
Alice, and also certify another one of Eve’s impostor keys
for Bob. After doing this, if Alice tried to look up Bob’s
key, she would find multiple independent pathways, all
with a short link of just 1 hop, leading to the impostor
key (and similarly, for Bob trying to find Alice’s key).
Despite being so easy to game the system, the WOT
has a lot of followers among security experts and privacy
enthusiasts that would call it a success based on their
own empirical observations that it appears to work. Of
course, it should come as no surprise that the WOT will
work to exchange the public keys between two parties,
neither of whom are high profile targets for espionage,
because hacking the WOT cannot be done en masse, and
would require some effort be expended for each target.
The general public largely uses unencrypted email,
and those with a genuine need for security are likely to
exchange keys over more secure channels. Thus, most
targets worth spying on aren’t using email encryption, or
know better than to use the WOT. Thus, there is simply
little incentive for spying agencies to subvert the WOT.
However, if the WOT were deployed on a massive
scale, as a means for exchanging public keys behind all
major email services in the background, then this would
certainly change. First, existence of a pathway of in-
troducers on the WOT would become almost meaning-
less, due to the large number of general users who might
be certifying keys with little regard to security. Sec-
ond, if an agency wanted to spy on some individual, they
would likely undertake means to start spreading impostor
keys, possibly using bots to sign key certificates, and they
would either succeed in intercepting some user’s requests
or create sufficient confusion about which key was correct
as to effectively serve as a denial of service (DOS) attack
against the usage of the WOT.
3 Key authentication protocol
In this section we introduce the proposed key authenti-
cation protocol. We begin by explaining the inspiration
from ‘ask me anyting’ (AMA) sessions on Reddit (Section
3.1), and show how this theory can be applied for secure
key exchange (Section 3.2). We call this Authentication
of Media Attestments (AMA), having an obvious dou-
ble meaning. We then detail the proposed protocol steps
for key registration (Section 3.3), lookup (Section 3.4),
rating (Section 3.5) and removal (Section 3.6). Finally,
we discuss community rating statistics (Section 3.7) and
guidelines for media attestment creation (Section 3.8).
3.1 Inspiration from Reddit
Celebrities sometimes make an appearance on the popular
geek news site Reddit [10] to answer questions. In order
to authenticate their identities, they sometimes provide
a photo of themselves holding a piece of paper indicating
that they are doing an AMA session (Fig. 1).
These photos are generally convincing because the
celebrity is recognizable, and because the piece of paper
indicates that an AMA session will be held. Although the
content of a piece of paper could potentially be changed
using image editing software, it would generally be dif-
ficult to acquire a photo of a celebrity in the posture of
holding up a piece of paper that could not be easily rec-
ognized as coming from some commercial work in TV or
film, which leads one to believe that the photos are au-
thentic.
The fundamental principle behind this type of authen-
tication is that a legitimate photo of oneself is extremely
easy to create, and generally easy for others to verify is
authentic, but very difficult to forge (although this does
not always stop people from trying).
A notable example is the fake AMA attempted for
Morgan Freeman, shown in Fig. 1d. This photo should
be immediately suspicious because Freeman is not actu-
ally holding the paper, and appears to have simply been
photographed while sleeping, and because the text on the
paper is not handwritten. The general consensus (after
much analysis on Reddit) is that the piece of paper pic-
tured in the photo was computer generated.
3.2 Adaptation for secure key exchange
A similar approach to Reddit AMA-style photos can be
used to verify ones public key, with the basic idea being
for the true owner to create some media file in which they
show some identification and communicate a hash of their
3
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Figure 1. Example of notable AMA’s from Reddit. (a) Arnold Schwarzenegger; (b) Bryan Cranston; (c) Bill Gates; (d) Morgan Freeman
(fake).
public key because a hash is shorter and easier to convey
verbally.
It would be insufficient to simply take a photo of one-
self holding up a card with the hash written out on it, due
to the ease with which a photo might be edited to change
the depicted characters in order to perpetrate a MITM
attack. Therefore, we consider video clips, and ask that
users communicate their key both visually and verbally,
while taking additional measures designed to increase the
difficulty of media editing to change the communicated
hash value. We discuss the specific guidelines for creat-
ing a video that is difficult to forge in Section 3.8.
A good media attestment effectively proves that an
individual is the owner of a public key, and a digital
signature from the associated private key can, by proxy,
be used to prove that this same individual has authored
any other information such as a preferred email address.
Thus, a keyserver can prove that there is no MITM simply
by providing a link to the media attestment in addition
to the public key. This is important, and fundamentally
different from any current keyservers, because it permits
a client to utiliize a keyserver without needing to blindly
trust the keyserver.
When a client requests the public key associated with
a contact address for the very first time, all they need to
do is watch the media attestment to see who they will be
communicating with. Because the keyserver must provide
the media attestment as proof, and because the media at-
testment is so difficult to forge, clients may trust that the
keyserver is incapable of performing a MITM attack and
not wish to bother watching the media attestment at all.
To further facilitate this, we introduce a community
rating scheme, whereby users who watch a video attest-
ment can rate the authenticity of this media attestment,
sign it with their own private key, and submit this to the
keyserver’s database. Then, in the future, the keyserver
can supply these signed ratings along with the media at-
testment itself, so that a client may opt to trust a public
key with sufficiently positive community ratings without
bothering to actually watch the media attestment.
The proposed protocol is similar to the MITM pro-
tection used in the ZRTP protocol [18] for VOIP com-
munications in Silent Circle, although there are some no-
table differences. First, because we apply it in a PKI
context, a user only needs to read a hash string once
(or when they change their password), rather than need-
ing to do it for every voice communication, as in ZRTP.
Second, the proposed media attesments provide MITM
protection for any form of communication such as email
and text, whereas ZRTP only works for VOIP commu-
nication. Third, the proposed media attestments must
follow guidelines involving multiple forms of communica-
tion that are much more difficult to forge. Finally, the
persistent nature of our media attestments allow commu-
nity vetting and rating to bring attention to suspicious
attestments.
3.3 Public key registration
In this section we describe the protocol for a user to reg-
ister their public key with a keyserver.
1. User computes the MD5 hash [11] of their public
key, which is shorter and more reasonable length to
read.
2. The user creates a media attestment of the hash
according to the guidelines (Section 3.8). This is
basically a video of them communicating the hash
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by reading it aloud (as a hex string) and showing
or writing out the hash string.
3. For each contact address (ie, email address, mobile
phone number, Facebook ID) that the user wishes
to associate with their key, they fill out a separate
identity card. The identity card contains their pub-
lic key, a hash of the media attestment (or url, if
hosted), and any other optional information such as
their name. Then the user signs the identity card
with their private key using a signature scheme such
as RSASSA-PSS, and sends all of the signed cards
to the keyserver. Each card only has one contact
address so that the server can provide the signed
card to a client without revealing the user’s other
contact methods and addresses.
4. The keyserver then verifies the contact address by
generating a nonce (random hex string) and send-
ing it to the supplied contact address as an HTML
query parameter to a webserver, which finalizes the
registration entry in the database.
3.4 Public key lookup
In this section we describe the protocol for obtaining and
validating a public key from a keyserver associated with
an email address.
1. The user sends an email address to query to the
keyserver.
2. The keyserver returns the identity card associated
with that email address, along with a list of user
ratings, and some aggregated statistics based on the
user ratings. For each community rating, the client
may lookup the public key for that user from their
contact address in order to verify their signature on
the rating card, if desired. Furthermore, the client
may verify the aggregated statistics from the collec-
tion of individual community ratings, if desired.
3. The client may opt to automatically trust the re-
turned key from on the aggregated statistics and/or
content of the individual rating cards, based on
some client or user specified thresholds/algorithms.
4. If the conditions for automatic trust are not met,
the user may view the included media attestment
and ratings, and either confirm or deny the authen-
ticity by filling out and submitting a rating card (as
described in Section 3.5).
3.5 Public key rating
In this section we describe the protocol for one user to
submit a rating of another’s media attestment:
1. After viewing the media attestment, the client is
presented with the following questions:
(a) Can you recognize the person in this video
as the actual owner of the contact address?
(yes/no/unsure)
(b) Does the hash communicated in the video
match the hash given in the identity card?
(yes/no/unsure)
(c) Does the video meet all mandatory guidelines
and appear authentic? (yes/no/unsure)
(d) Additional comments? (text)
2. The answers to these questions, along with the rat-
ing user’s contact address, the original identity card
being rated, and the current time, are signed with
the client’s private key and returned to the key-
server after solving a CAPTCHA [17] test.
3. The keyserver adds the clients rating to its database
and updates the aggregate rating statistics (Section
3.7).
3.6 Public key editing/removal
The process for editing a public key registration is simply
to remove it and then re-upload a new key. The process
for removing a key record is simple:
1. User sends a request to remove a contact address
signed with their private key.
2. Server verifies that the signature matches the pub-
lic key on file for that address. If so, the identity
card is deleted.
Alternatively, if the user has lost their private key,
they can remove the old public key by verifying owner-
ship of the contact address:
1. User sends a request to remove the identity card
associated with a contact address.
2. Server replies to the contact address with a random
nonce.
3. User replies by confirming the nonce, and server
deletes the identity card.
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3.7 Aggregated rating statistics
The following aggregated ratings statistics are computed
from individual user ratings, and serve to assist the client
software and determining whether or not to trust a public
key without bothering to view the media attestment:
S1 Total number of user ratings.
S2 Count of the number of ratings which confirmed
owner’s identity.
S3 Count of the number of ratings which denied owner’s
identity.
S4 Count of the number of ratings which confirmed the
correct hash value.
S5 Count of the number of ratings which denied the cor-
rect hash value.
S6 Count of the number of ratings which confirmed the
video authenticity.
S7 Count of the number of ratings which denied the video
authenticity.
It should be noted that these statistics are only pro-
vided as a convenience, and can be calculated and verified
from the client from the raw user ratings. Moreover, the
client software is free to use any algorithm desired to de-
termine whether or not they want to trust the provided
key. We suggest trusting the key under the conditions
that
α < S1
β < min(S2− S3, S4− S5, S6− S7)/S1,
where α ≥ 0 and β ∈ (0, 1] are user-tunable thresholds in
the client software.
3.8 Media attestment guidelines
A media attestment is a video file created by the user in
which they communicate a hash of their public key. It is
critical that a media attestment be created in such a way
that it would be difficult to modify and change the com-
municated key, and also difficult for any other person to
create. With these goals in mind, the following guidelines
are proposed:
• The video should be shot in a single take and main-
tain focus on the users face throughout to prevent
the opportunity for an attacker to perform splicing.
• The user should introduce themself briefly and show
some form of ID, such as a drivers license or pass-
port.
• The user should then speak the hash of their public
key aloud, without using a monotone voice, and by
reading the digits in short groups so that segmenta-
tion of the vocalizations corresponding to individual
letters is more difficult.
• The video should contain some background noise or
music that is not easily separable from the vocals,
to further increase the difficulty of segmenting the
vocalizations of each character.
• The hash should be communicated in a visual way
as well. This could be done using a hand-written
card that is held in the field of view. If so, the card
should be rotated at some point to increase the diffi-
culty of automated tracking and replacement of the
card text using video editing software.
• For maximum security, users may opt to write the
hash out during the video onto a pane of glass that
is suspended between the user and the recording de-
vice, thereby permitting both the users face and the
handwriting to remain in view simultaneously at all
times. This would make video editing and replace-
ment of the characters impossible because they are
linked to hand motions. In this case, it is recom-
mended to flip the video horizontally so that the
key can be read left to right.
4 Potential attacks
In this section we examine the potential attack surfaces
and discuss resistances to these attacks. There are a num-
ber of different ways that a man in the middle (MITM)
attack might be attempted, so we discuss these methods
and the proposed protocol’s cryptographic resistances to
them separately in the following subsections.
In general, the following MITM attacks would be eas-
iest to perform by the keyserver itself. However, clients
could detect these attempted MITM attacks by periodi-
cally querying the keyserver for their own contact address
from anonymous IP addresses. If the wrong public key is
returned, then the client would know that a MITM attack
is being attempted, and the keyserver would lose credibil-
ity. Thus, even if the technical limitations could somehow
be overcome, it is unlikely that a keyserver would be com-
placent in performing MITM attacks.
If the keyserver is not complacent in MITM attacks,
then an attacker would first need to gain access to the
user’s communication client (i.e., email) in order to com-
plete the key registration procedure with the keyserver
before attempting a MITM attack. Although this might
be achievable in special cases by using tactics of social
engineering, it is not something that could be easily em-
ployed en masse for anyone except the communications
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provider, unless the communications provider itself were
compromised or complacent. In this case, clients would
still be able to detect attempted MITM attacks by query-
ing the keyserver and checking the returned public key.
4.1 Preimage hash attack
Theoretically, an attacker could extract the media attest-
ment from a valid identity card and repackage it into a
new identity card using a different public key that has the
same hash value. This is known as the second preimage
attack on the hash function [12].
For an ideal n-bit hash function, the fastest way to
compute a second preimage is a brute force enumeration
that has time complexity 2n, and is generally considered
secure for n ≥ 64. All currently known practical attacks
on MD5 [14, 15, 16] are collision attacks.
Recently, a theoretical attack was published that
breaks MD5’s preimage resistance, reducing the time
complexity of attack from 2128 to 2123.4 [7, 13]. However,
this is still well above the 264 needed to be considered
secure. Despite that MD5 is not the most secure hash
available, we prefer it to other alternatives for its small
output space, which makes reading the hash value in me-
dia attestments easier for the user.
4.2 Media editing attack
Theoretically, an attacker could extract the media at-
testment from a valid identity card, modify the video to
change the communicated hash value (written, spoken,
and possibly gestured) to match the hash of the attacker’s
key, and then repackage it into a new identity card.
The media attestment guidelines (Section 3.8) are
specifically designed to make this task sufficiently diffi-
cult that users may be confident a media editing attack
could not be performed – at least not with any automated
tools. Indeed, the level of artistic and technical sophis-
tication necessary to convincingly create such an attack
is so high that only a professional visual effects company
might attempt it, but even then it is dubious whether the
results could be convincing.
4.3 Impostor attack
In the impostor attack, the attacker uses a video of him-
self (or someone else) attesting to the attacker’s public
key, but claiming the identity and/or contact address
(email) of someone else. This attack would clearly not
work against anyone whose identity could be recognized
visually, such as a friend, family member, acquintance, or
famous person. Nonetheless, it may be a concern when
communicating with online identities. For this reason, we
ask that users show some form of identification (driver’s
license or passport) in their media attestment. In addi-
tion, a user may examine the rating statistics of other
members.
5 Implementation
We have implemented registration and lookup services of
the proposed system with a public keyserver that is online
at https://www.authma.com. Future work will integrate
the proposed rating scheme as well as implementing ex-
ample webmail client using the messaging protocol.
5.1 Client software support
In this section we discuss features that a client software
(e.g., a webmail client, mobile phone app, or Facebook
app) using the proposed AMA-style key exchange should
support. First, the client’s private key should not be
stored or retrieved on any third party servers, as this
would violate the most fundamental principle of end-to-
end encryption.
If the client is a web client, the key also cannot be
stored locally, as this would not be available when chang-
ing machines. Therefore, the most logical way of storing a
key is in the user’s memory as a passphrase. A passphrase
can be used to derive a public-private keypair at login
time by running it through a key expansion algorithm
(e.g., PBKDF2 [5]) to generate a seed for a cryptograph-
ically secure random number generator that is used to
generate an RSA keypair.
Thus, if using a web client, there are necessarily two
password fields that must be entered by the user: one to
authenticate with the webservice provider, and the other
password to be used locally by the client for encryption
and decryption.
The client should probably support both unencrypted
and encrypted comunication, and only use encryption if
both the sender and receiver have generated a keypair.
In order to properly support AMA-style key retrieval, the
client should have user-controlled thresholds based on the
aggregated community statistics in order to determine if
a key can be trusted automatically. The client must also
support functionality for viewing the media attestment,
as well as the list of community ratings, means for ver-
ifying the signatures on those ratings, and submitting a
new rating on a viewed attestment.
After the client establishes trust of a new identity card
(which contains public key, media attestment, contact ad-
dress and user identity), the client should sign this card
and cache it for future reference. This prevents the need
for re-querying the keyserver in the future, and signing it
prevents the cache entries from being modified by a third
party who might have access to the account, such as one’s
service provider.
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In order to support content-based searching of en-
crypted messages, the client should maintain a search
index of all decrypted messages (as well as outgoing mes-
sages prior to encryption). This search index should be
encrypted with the user’s private key. If the client is a
web client, the search index should be stored in the cloud,
so that the client can automatically re-download it when
being used from a new machine.
In some cases, a contact address might be used
by multiple people, such as a business address like
support@company.com. Because this address is used by
multiple people, it could not be registered with the key-
server for AMA-style authentication. However, the own-
ers of this address may still wish to communicate with
users via end-to-end encryption. This can be accom-
plished if the business encrypts their public key inside
the contents of encrypted outgoing messages. Thus, in
order to process such communications seamlessly, a client
software should be prepared to extract public keys from
incoming messages using an established protocol, as well
as embed one’s public key in outgoing encrypted mes-
sages.
Finally, a client application may wish to query the
keyserver for their own address on occassion, from an
anonymizing proxy, just to double check that the returned
public key is indeed their own public key. This provides
additional security and peace of mind.
6 Conclusion
Many users would prefer privacy in their communications
(as can only be achieved with end-to-end encryption), but
not without sacrificing the convenience they have come
to expect from webmail clients. In particular, users don’t
want the hassle of manually managing public and private
keys as typically required for end-to-end encryption.
Although PGP’s Web of Trust and open PGP key-
servers are designed to mitigate this problem, they cannot
be trusted enough for fully automatic key distribution,
and hence key management remains a user problem. Ser-
vices such as Lavabit and Hushmail have attempted to
make PGP more user-friendly by taking care of key man-
agement, but in so doing they have given up the funda-
mental privacy guarantees of end-to-encryption that mo-
tivate the use of PGP in the first place.
In this paper, we have proposed a fundamentally new
approach by empowering end-users with the capacity to
independently verify the authenticity of a public key. This
permits email client software to automatically lookup
public keys associated with an email addresses from a
keyserver without needing to trust the keyserver, because
any MITM attacks could be detected by end-users. Thus,
our protocol enables a new breed of messaging clients with
true end-to-end encryption built in, without the hassle of
requiring users to manually manage the public keys for
their contacts, and without relying on any third party to
keep certain information secret.
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